Origins of Moakley’s Involvement: Early Efforts to End U.S. Aid to El Salvador (1981-1982)
"I am appalled by the apparent insensitivity of the Reagan Administration toward the atrocities that are now occurring daily in El Salvador. The fact that the United States is militarily maintaining a regime that is oppressing its people is a betrayal of the very ideals of our founding fathers."1
Congressman Joe Moakley had a reputation as a “bread and butter” politician. However, the early 1980s saw him broaden his horizons to include the Central American nation of El Salvador and the tumult and violence of its civil war. Foreign affairs may seem contrary to Moakley’s focus on district issues, but the documents presented here reveal that his earliest motives for combatting Salvadoran human rights violations align closely with his core values of justice and freedom for everyday people. Beginning with his opposition to military aid that the United States provided to the Salvadoran government, these documents provide evidence of Moakley’s abhorrence of the violence of the civil war and the impact that it had on innocent people. Those sentiments would come to inform his involvement with United States-Salvadoran relations throughout his career, and they show that it is possible for a politician with strong local ties to have an international impact.
“Let us remember them for their courage and determination in carrying the banner for social justice.”
When El Salvador’s right-wing military government came to power in 1979, its ideology included fierce opposition to communism and the left-wing rebels of the Farabuno Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN (its Spanish acronym). The government elite feared uprisings among the poorer classes and others who might have communist sympathies, and as a result, they frequently persecuted the poor and their allies. Among the poor’s allies were religious figures, most notably men and women of the Catholic Church. In March 1980, members of the military assassinated Archbishop Oscar Romero while he said Mass.2 In December of the same year, another vicious act of violence occurred: the rape and murder of three nuns and a female missionary from the United States. The Salvadoran government investigated the crime, but even a year later, it still had not made any convictions. Moakley was raised Catholic, so the brutality of this crime, and the Catholic faith of its victims, outraged him.
Shortly after the one-year anniversary, he expressed his extreme frustration with the investigation in a statement on the floor of the House of Representatives, which was published in the Congressional Record. He referred to the arrest of six Salvadoran soldiers in April of 1981, but noted that the government had done nothing to ensure a conviction.3 He also faulted the U.S. government for deciding to increase military aid to the government whose soldiers were responsible for the murders, which it did, as we will see, on the basis of its own fears of communism. (An advisor to President Ronald Reagan, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, had even called the victims “leftist activists” and implied that they brought the crime upon themselves.4) Moakley concluded his statement by stating, “let us have the foresight and commonsense to not let their deaths have been in vain.” With this remark, Moakley, most likely unknowingly, set the tone for a future career spent championing the rights of Salvadorans to live peacefully.
Earlier in 1981, Moakley’s colleague, Congressman Gerry Studds (D-MA), had helped pass legislation to put certain qualifications on the aid that El Salvador received from the United States. In the face of a Republican majority that would not budge on its desire to suppress the leftist rebels, Studds and several colleagues “forged a compromise…that required the president to come before Congress and certify that El Salvador was making progress on human rights issues” before the U.S. government would release more funds.5 To the dismay of Moakley, Studds, and other opponents of military aid, at the end of January 1982, President Reagan issued just such a certification (even amidst reports of a violent military attack on the village of El Mozote, which resulted in the deaths of 700 civilians).6
“…the Congress…has regretfully concluded that it must respectfully disagree with the executive branch conclusion…”
Congressman Studds wasted no time in condemning Reagan’s certification. In this “discussion draft” dated January 25, Studds outlined a joint resolution that he intended to introduce in the House of Representatives. He hoped that his congressional colleagues would join him in “declaring the President’s certification with respect to El Salvador to be null and void.”
“Our support of this government, through military means, is nothing short of unconscionable.”
On February 1, 1982, Moakley voiced his opposition to Reagan’s policies, as well. He sent this letter to the President, disavowing not only monetary aid to El Salvador’s military, but also the training of Salvadoran troops in the United States. He commented on the recent arrival of “60 sergeants and officers” at Fort Bragg amidst reports that “well over 9,000 political murders were committed in the first six months of 1981 alone.” Echoing the sentiments that he expressed in his denunciation of both the United States and Salvadoran governments’ handling (or mishandling) of the churchwomen murder investigation, Moakley called on Reagan to “lessen American military involvement” in El Salvador, because continuing such aid would only lead to further oppression, or even killing, of innocent people. In an attempt to appeal to Reagan’s support of national defense initiatives, Moakley also expressed his fear that soon, “we will see the first American soldier come home from El Salvador in a coffin.” In a written reply, Reagan’s assistant, Kenneth Duberstein, acknowledged his receipt of Moakley’s note and assured him, “Please know that your concerns will continue to receive very careful consideration.”
“Many…believe the evidence is overwhelming that the President has certified more to what he wishes were the case in El Salvador, than to what is actually taking place.”
On February 2, 1982, Congressman Studds moved past the draft stage and announced the official introduction of a joint resolution that would not only render President Reagan’s certification null and void, but also “suspend U.S. military assistance until the House and Senate have jointly concluded that the conditions established by law have truly been achieved.” In a ten-page statement, Studds summarized recent reports on human rights violations and detailed the five conditions required in order for the U.S. government to reinstate aid, among them “a concerted effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights” and an end to “the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens” by the military.
“I am appalled by the apparent insensitivity of the Reagan Administration toward the atrocities that are now occurring daily in El Salvador.”
If Moakley was not prepared to address Reagan’s certification in his February 1 letter, he certainly was two days letter, when his office issued this press release. Moakley reiterated some of what he wrote in his letter, but went further in criticizing the Reagan administration’s continuing support of a right-win government whose tactics may have actually encouraged, not suppressed, the communism that it feared. His language was even more caustic than in previous statements; he called Reagan’s policies “distorted,” “twisted,” and “a betrayal of the very ideals of our founding fathers.” The press release indicated that Moakley had signed on as a co-sponsor of Congressman Gerry Studds’ resolution; putting his name on paper was a fitting next step in his quest to end military aid to El Salvador.
“The people of El Salvador have already been dealt death, destruction and brutality beyond anything we can imagine.”
Back in Moakley’s congressional district, Boston’s Central American Solidarity Association (CASA) planned “an emergency protest march and rally” for February 13, 1982, to voice their opposition to the continued military aid to El Salvador. CASA issued a press release that listed the wide range of humanitarian organizations that sponsored the event and summarized the events that prompted it; they quoted one activist who characterized Reagan’s certification as “approach[ing] obscenity in its disregard of the facts.” Although he was unable to attend the rally, Moakley drafted a short statement to be read on his behalf at the event. It is unclear whether anyone actually did read his statement, but his willingness to participate in the rally, albeit by proxy, showed that he was not afraid to voice his concerns in a public forum, before an audience of his constituents. His statement echoed CASA’s rejection of Reagan’s policies and called for an end to military aid “before we all find ourselves in an unnecessary and interminable war in Central America.”
“We believe this training will enable the Salvadoran Army to protect its citizens more effectively against insurgent attacks…”
On March 5, 1982, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Powell A. Moore, responded to Moakley’s February letter to President Reagan. In his reply, Moore outlined the anti-communist reasoning behind the decision to train Salvadoran soldiers at Fort Bragg—what he called the need “to counter the hit-and-run tactics of the Marxist guerillas.” He asserted that a well-trained Salvadoran military would help ensure the country’s successful transition to an effective democracy.
With his letter, Moore also included a copy of this “Justification for Presidential Determination to Authorize Continued Security Assistance for El Salvador.”
“The overwhelming opposition to this administration’s El Salvador policy by the vast majority of Americans should be taken as a demand that Congress put an end to this reckless course.”
Meanwhile, despite the fact that Congressman Studds’ resolution had yet to make any progress, on March 8, 1982, Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-NY) introduced an even farther-reaching proposal. His resolution, detailed in this Congressional Record article, called for an immediate end to all military aid to El Salvador, “with the exception of permitting articles presently in the pipeline to reach their destination.”
Moakley’s aide, Jim McGovern, sent him a memo urging him to support Rosenthal’s resolution; he called the resolution “consistent with everything else you have cosponsored and said on the floor.” McGovern also made the interesting comment that Rosenthal’s proposal “merely calls for the immediate termination of military aid to El Salvador [emphasis added].” McGovern, and most likely Moakley, was clearly of the mindset that ending U.S. aid to a violent military regime was not too much to ask.
“We believe…that a political settlement to the conflict in El Salvador will not be achieved through the use of arms.”
On March 12, 1982, a Boston Globe article reported that Congress planned to shelve Studds’ resolution at least until after El Salvador’s March 28 constituent assembly elections.7 This development, however, apparently did not deter Rosenthal, who sought support for his resolution from his congressional counterparts in two back-to-back “Dear Colleague” letters. In the first letter, dated March 29, Rosenthal and his original co-sponsors cited a recent poll numbers that showed most Americans opposed the Reagan administration’s military involvement letter. In the second later, dated April 1, Rosenthal reiterated the points of his first letter, but now had the results of El Salvador’s constituent assembly elections to reflect upon. The situation was quite complicated, but in short, the election resulted in increased power for a violent right-wing politician named Roberto D’Aubuisson (whom later investigations confirmed had been responsible for ordering the March 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero).8 In his second letter, Rosenthal vowed, “The United States cannot participate in the wholesale bloodshed that Mr. D’Aubuisson’s coalition intends to pursue.” Moakley had evidently taken McGovern’s advice and signed on as a co-sponsor of Rosenthal’s resolution, H. J. Res. 426; his name appeared on a list that accompanied the two “Dear Colleague” letters. Given his repeated denunciation of U.S. support for the Salvadoran government’s violent tactics, Moakley’s co-sponsorship is not surprising.
The outcome of Rosenthal’s resolution is unclear; according to a Library of Congress bill summary, its last major action was a March 18, 1982, referral to the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Congressman Studds’ resolution evidently met some measure of success. A June 23 Boston Globe article indicated that the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved “a resolution calling on President Ronald Reagan to assure Congress that the Salvadoran government is continuing to investigate” recent human rights violations and had “adopted a measure sponsored by [Congressman Studds] to require such assurances to be contained in an official certification on human rights in El Salvador.” This measure, however, was nearly identical to the one that Studds had helped pass in 1981, and it had an identical result: on July 27, 1982, President Reagan certified that El Salvador was making sufficient progress, paving the way for military aid to continue.9
“Mr. Speaker, the United States should be working for and urging a negotiated settlement in El Salvador and not sustaining the present extremist regime with arms.”
The day after Reagan’s certification, Moakley gave remarks before the House, and he made his “outrage” quite clear: “Never in my recollection has any previous administration so dangerously combined an ignorance of history with a total misreading of current reality as have President Reagan and his advisors in their policy toward El Salvador.” He vowed to continue supporting efforts to nullify the certification and ultimately to suspend all military aid. With his scathing criticism of the Reagan administration, Moakley showed that he would not back down in this fight.
Despite the repeated failures of congressional efforts to end military aid to El Salvador, Moakley’s actions over the course of 1982 show the rapid growth of his commitment to seeking justice and peace in that country. El Salvador’s human rights violations appalled Moakley to such an extent that he became invested in ensuring a better future for the people of El Salvador who lived in fear of becoming victims themselves. As the documents in this exhibit show, the first way that he saw to do this was to oppose U.S. military aid to the Salvadoran government, or at least to make such aid conditional upon assurances (agreed upon by Congress, not just mandated by the president) that El Salvador was actually working effectively to create a more peaceful, democratic society. These efforts, unfortunately, would not come to fruition until nearly eight years later, after more human rights violations occurred.
Beginning in early 1983, though, while U.S. aid continued to flow into El Salvador, Moakley turned his attention more specifically to issues of immigration and allowing innocent Salvadorans into the United States without fear of deportation. The next section “Immigration Reform: Extended Voluntary Departure and Other Avenues,” chronicles the beginning of those efforts.
Next: Immigration Reform: Extended Voluntary Departure and Other Avenues (1983-1988)
Notes:
1 John Joseph Moakley. “DI-1227 Moakley news release on Reagan certification.” The People's Congressman: Joe Moakley's Mission for Peace and Justice in El Salvador. Accessed July 18, 2016. https://moakleyandelsalvador.omeka.net/admin/items/show/105.
2 Mark Schneider, Joe Moakley’s Journey: From South Boston to El Salvador (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013), 128.
3 Joe Frazier, "6 held in death of nuns," Boston Globe, May 10, 1981, accessed July 25, 2016, ProQuest.
5 Schneider, Joe Moakley's Journey, 130.
6 "Reagan clears way to Salvador aid," Boston Globe, January 29, 1982, accessed July 25, 2016, ProQuest; Schneider, 130. For more on the “El Mozote massacre,” see Mark Danner, The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
7 William Chapman, "House panel defers Salvador vote," Boston Globe, March 12, 1982, accessed July 25, 2016, ProQuest.
8 Teresa Whitfield, Paying the Price: Ignacia Ellacuria and Murdered Jesuits of El Salvador (Philadelphia, Temple University Press), 386.
9 Robert Parry, "Salvador approved for more US aid," Bston Globe, July 28, 1982, accessed July 25, 2016, ProQuest.