Progress on All Fronts (May 1990-November 1990)

Dear Colleague letter from Moakley and Murtha

“We feel this substitute is an improvement on an already strong bill and as such should be supported.”

The Supplemental Assistance for Emerging Democracies Act of 1990 (H.R. 4636) came up for vote in May 1990. Moakley joined with Congressman John Murtha (D-PA), a member of his task force, to introduce “improvements” (also referred to as “substitutions”) to that legislation. These improvements were a response to the Moakley Commission’s conclusions that violence in El Salvador would continue if the United States did not place further restrictions on monetary aid. The original legislation was, in fact, quite far-reaching. It stipulated that for fiscal year 1990 and 1991, the United States would withhold 50% of military aid, then transfer it to humanitarian aid and the end of each fiscal year. In addition, the president of the United States would have the authority “to either restore the withheld 50% or impose a full 100% cut in military aid if the President finds that certain actions have or have not been taken by the government of El Salvador or the FMLN.” But Moakley and Murtha proposed more explicit language in the bill that would eliminate confusion about aid requirements and ensure the accountability of both the Salvadoran military and the FMLN. In asking for these changes, they sought to preempt the problems that arose from previous aid certifications (most notably by President Ronald Reagan).

Dear Colleague letter from Tip O'Neill

“Let’s do what is necessary to prevent further bloodshed in a country that has already suffered too much.”

Congressmen Moakley and Murtha had the support of at least one of their congressional colleagues: former Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill (D-MA). Just one day after Moakley and Murtha sent their “Dear Colleague” letter, Congressman O’Neill sent one of his own. He eschewed the statistics of Moakley and Murtha’s letter in favor of an emotional plea to his colleagues to support the substitution as a means to end the Salvadoran civil war. Echoing sentiments that members of the Speaker’s Task Force expressed during their February 1990 trip and in their interim report, O’Neill noted that he feared “that unless the Congress and the Administration are prepared to cut back on the seemingly endless supply of U.S. dollars for military aid, the killing [in El Salvador] will continue.” Since it included strict conditions for aid based on the actions of both the military and the FMLN, the Moakley-Murtha proposal provided incentives for both parties to cease their violent tactics and begin peace negotiations.

Moakley's remarks on Moakley-Murtha proposal

“Mr. Speaker, I am a bread and butter politician from South Boston—not a foreign policy expert…But when it comes to the issues of life and death, justice and injustice, dignity and inhumanity -­you don't need a Ph.d. [sic] in foreign policy to take a stand.”

On May 22, 1990, Moakley expanded upon O’Neill’s sentiments in a passionate speech in the House in support of his and Congressman Murtha’s substitution, and of the overall supplemental authorization bill. With the memory of visiting the scene of the Jesuit murders fresh in his mind, Moakley expressed his anger that the United States had ever supported El Salvador financially. He noted that he had “concluded that the American people and the American Congress have been played for fools by the Salvadoran military and forces from both the left and the right who need war to continue in order to sustain and expand their power and dominance in that troubled land.” As he had previously, he denounced the FMLN as well as the military, in an effort to assure his colleagues that he was not taking political sides in the matter. He asserted that the Moakley-Murtha proposal would “restore to the civilian government of El Salvador the rightful authority to meet the needs of its people an end the tyranny of the corrupt and violent.” Moakley clearly felt that his proposal had the potential to change El Salvador for the better. His impassioned speech made an impact on his colleagues; the House passed the Moakley-Murtha amendment that day. Unfortunately, though, the overall bill, H.R. 4636 did not pass.²

Another statement on Moakley-Murtha proposal

“Our action today means that the United States will work actively to promote a settlement of the war and broad political participation—rather than continue a policy that only sustains the military conflict.”

Moakley did not have to wait long for another chance at success with his substation bill. On June 27, 1990, the House passed both the Moakley-Murtha proposal and the new bill to which it was attached, the FY 1991 Foreign Aid Appropriations Bill (H.R 5114). That day, Moakley’s office issued a press release with his statement on the bill’s passage, which he called “a decisive and constructive step toward achieving a policy that defends human rights and supports a negotiated solution” to the Salvadoran civil war. As was becoming his modus operandi, Moakley began his statement by invoking the horrific murders of the Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter and noting that he had spent a significant amount of time “monitoring the investigation…and examining other issues concerning El Salvador.” In doing so, he emphasized both El Salvador’s recent history of violence and his own authority as the chair of the Speaker’s Task Force. He likely hoped that these facts would give him leverage as he sought support for aid reductions and conditions. He would not see further progress on the bill until the Senate’s vote in October, but other developments kept him occupied in the meantime.

Report on August 1990 staff trip to El Salvador

“We believe that a concerted effort has been made by the armed forces, including the High Command, to contain the investigation; to avoid implicating any individual except those charged; and, almost certainly, to prevent the conviction of Col. Benavides.”

In August 1990, another delegation of Speaker’s Task Force staff returned to El Salvador (like the January trip, this one included only staff, not full members). Three days after their return, the staff issued a report to Congressman Moakley in which they summarized their findings. They asserted that Salvadoran investigators had made progress in the Jesuit murders case, but noted that one of the primary factors impeding the investigation was lack of cooperation within the military. In pursuing the possibility that members of the High Command were responsible for ordering the murders, the task force staff uncovered inconsistent testimonies among those members of the military interviewed by investigators. For example, Colonel Carlos Aviles, the officer from whom Major Eric Buckland told investigators he received information implicating Colonel Benavides, denied knowing Major Buckland very well; the task force discovered that Colonel Aviles’ claim was false (like the interim report, this report did not use Major Buckland’s name). The staff’s findings also led them to believe that the Military Honor Board, which was responsible for reviewing evidence in the case, implicated only lower-level military members as a means of deflecting blame from members of the military’s High Command. One significant point that they raised was that, “It remains unclear exactly how Salvadoran authorities determined who to arrest in this case. On January 5, 47 soldiers were detained; eleven days later, 9 of those soldiers were arrested. How did the authorities separate the 9 alleged to be guilty from the rest?” In their report, the staff delegation members do not outline any future plans or recommendations for the task force, but their discoveries undoubtedly fueled its continued efforts to seek the truth about a cover-up.

Buckland Statement

“I am angry—and I feel misled. It makes me wonder what else we have not been told.”

Later in 1990, Moakley received information from an unnamed source about Major Eric Buckland that delivered a blow to the Moakley Commission and its investigation. He and the task force had previously determined that Buckland did not report his knowledge of the alleged perpetrators of the Jesuit murders because he feared retaliation. He ultimately chose to testify after realizing that Colonel Aviles was not likely to implicate himself and determining that if he did not step forward, no one else would. Moakley and the task force sympathized with his predicament; they did not name him in their interim report because they understood his fears and wanted to protect him. In mid-October 1990, however, Moakley learned that the FBI had withheld from the Speaker’s Task Force certain information from Buckland’s January 1992 testimonies, specifically that Buckland had at one point said that he actually knew about the murder plans before the killings took place, going back to a discussion he had with Colonel Benavides in October 1989; in a subsequent interview, he recanted that account and claimed that he did not have “prior knowledge” of the murders.

In a scathing statement following this revelation, Moakley attacked U.S. government officials for failing to provide not only him, but the Salvadoran investigators, with the full transcripts of all of Buckland’s statements and other relevant documentation.  He noted that the FBI actually did provide full documentation to the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador on January 13, yet neither of those parties gave those documents to the Moakley Commission. Although Moakley’s naming of Buckland in his statement indicated that he no longer felt compelled to protect his identity, the issue of whether or not he actually had prior knowledge of the murders was less important to him than the U.S. government’s cover-up of the information. He called the situation “a major screw-up.” The reasons behind the U.S. government’s decision to withhold Buckland’s prior knowledge statement are quite convoluted, but whatever their reasoning, the exposure of this deception left Moakley questioning the integrity of the Jesuit murder investigation even more than he had previously.³ He concluded his statement by affirming, “I do not know whether the withholding of the information was intentional—or whether it was incompetence. In either case, it’s inexcusable. But we’ll find the truth.”⁴

Dear Colleague letter

“We believe that it is in the humanitarian traditions and the national interest of the United States to provide this modest but necessary relief to those uprooted by conflicts in their homeland.”

Fortunately, as he dealt with the Buckland controversy, Moakley saw positive developments in other areas of his work related to El Salvador. In early October, he and several of his fellow representatives composed a Dear Colleague letter asking for support for a bill that would allow refugees from El Salvador and several other countries “a 3-year temporary suspension from deportation.” Part of H.R. 4300, an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, this call for “Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) was an attempt to obtain the benefits that legislative predecessors such as Extended Voluntary Departure had failed to secure. Moakley and his congressional colleagues noted, “The main purpose of this measure is to provide protection to the innocent victims of war, random violence and widespread civil strife.” To appease opponents who feared that such refugees would be a strain on U.S. resources, the provision stipulated that recipients of TPS “would be ineligible for any federal benefits; and there would be no obligations for state and local governments to provide benefits.” By supporting this legislation, Moakley asserted his position that the problems in El Salvador, which he saw firsthand during his trip there in February, and the U.S. government’s contributions to those problems through its military aid, warranted assistance from the United States for Salvadoran refugees.

Remarks at Georgetown University

“I pledge here, today, at this place that symbolizes all that is great in the Jesuit tradition, that our work will continue until justice is no longer just an abstract concept in El Salvador, and until a true and lasting peace is at hand.”

On November 13, 1990, Moakley spoke at Jesuit-founded Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. By this time, he knew that President Bush was preparing to sign the aid reduction and TPS bills into law, but his remarks at the university focused mainly on the Jesuit murders and the need for justice and peace in El Salvador. Again leading with a description of the crime and of his leadership of the Speaker’s Task Force, Moakley outlined the importance of justice in the Jesuit murders case as a precursor for wider reform of El Salvador’s judicial and political systems, with a peace agreement between the military and the FMLN as the primary goal. Acknowledging Congress’s passage of the Moakley-Murtha provisions, he summarized three factors required for peace: “First, the Salvadoran government must make clear that those who violate human rights will be punished…Second, the FMLN has to meet the conditions set out in the new U.S. law…Third, the United States must become the leading international supporter of peace.” In reference to his last point, he condemned, as he had in the past, the violence of the FMLN, but noted that “for too long, too many in the [U.S.] Executive branch have felt that by criticizing the Salvadoran military they would be giving aid and comfort to the FMLN…But it is important to remember, if not for the corruption and human rights violations of the military, there would be no FMLN.” He called for President Bush to “implement our new law fairly and honestly.” 

Moakley then shifted to a more emotional subject, one that served as personal motivation for seeking justice in the murder case: his friendship with two of the victims, Father Segundo Montes and Father Ignacio Ellacuria.⁷  But for him, justice in this case was not only about justice for his friends. It was about the “70,000 men, women and children, each of whom had friends, brothers, sisters, mother and father,” who had lost their lives since the start of the civil war. The priests were a high-profile example of the war’s tremendous human toll. That sentiment motivated Moakley as he looked ahead to El Salvador’s future. He promised that the Speaker’s Task Force would continue its work “until justice is no longer just an abstract concept in El Salvador, and until a true and lasting peace is at hand.”