Moakley Commission: Lead-up to Interim Report (January 1990-April 1990)
“[Peace] could, in short, lend added meaning to Salvadoran democracy; opportunity to the Salvadoran economy; hope to the Salvadoran people; and life, itself, to a nation that has been paralyzed for a decade by a brutal civil war.”1
One month after the January 1990 fact-finding mission, Congressman Moakley and the other members (not just the staff) of the Speaker’s Task Force made their first trip to El Salvador. It proved to be an enlightening journey that helped direct their future actions. Over the course of the trip, Moakley began to understand more fully the extent of El Salvador’s political, military, and judicial problems. He recognized that the task force must address larger systemic issues if they had any hope of seeing justice in the Jesuit murder case. The Moakley Commission’s over 100-page interim report in April 1990, excerpts from which appear below, summarized all of their findings and re-confirmed Moakley’s commitment to peace in El Salvador and for its people.
“We are hopeful that this trip and the investigation of the task force will produce answers and will contribute to the achievement of peace with democracy in El Salvador.”
On February 11, Moakley left for his first trip to El Salvador as chairman of the Speaker’s Task Force. Before departing from Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, he delivered a statement in which he expressed his conviction that despite the progress in the investigation, including the arrests of those believed responsible, many questions still existed about the murders and their relationship to larger issues of human rights and political and judicial corruption. Alluding to these larger issues, he noted that a central question was “whether the human rights problems in El Salvador—including the Jesuit killings—are the actions of a few renegade military and political figures…or whether, in fact, they stem from attitudes and actions that go to the very heart of the armed forced and other major institutions.” The task force planned to search for answers to such questions during the course of their four-day trip. The delegation included ten members of the all-Democrat task force as well as five Republicans; this new display of bipartisanship indicated that Moakley had made headway in garnering support even among those on the other side of the political aisle.
“President Cristiani reiterated his government’s commitment to human rights and an internal peace process…”
An important order of business for the delegation was to meet with El Salvador’s president, Alfredo Cristiani, a meeting that took place on February 13. With both Democrats and Republicans present, the tone of the meeting often shifted depending on the party affiliation of the person speaking. The Republican task force members were more complimentary of Cristiani and the progress of the murder investigation, and they emphasized the importance of fighting against FMLN forces. They were less convinced that the military was responsible for the Jesuit murders. Congressman Bill McCollum (R-FL), who had visited El Salvador six times in the previous seven years, called the 1989 presidential election (which Cristiani won) “a marvelous example of democracy at work” and asserted that he had seen improvements in human rights issues. Congressman David Dreier (R-CA) went further, stating that he “was convinced that the government had done everything possible” to investigate the Jesuit murders and that the $4 billion in aid that the U.S. had sent to El Salvador since the start of the civil war was “an excellent investment” against “the FMLN offensive.”
The Democrats also expressed respect for Cristiani and acknowledged the difficulties of his job as a civilian president in a military government, but they were more forceful in their assertions that he had to work harder to improve relations between his administration, the military, and the FMLN. Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) “noted a sense of déjà vu” in that she first visited El Salvador after the churchwomen murders in 1980, only to return less than ten years later in the aftermath of more deaths. Unlike McCollum, Kennelly did not see any improvement in human rights issues. Kennelly and her Democratic colleagues warned Cristiani that U.S. aid was in jeopardy if he did not achieve actual results in ended human rights abuses. Despite some differences of opinion, Ambassador Walker wrote in his summary of the meeting that “without except, codel [congressional delegation] members expressed their support for Cristiani personally, but stressed that strong domestic pressure was building in the US.” Even if the Republicans felt that the FMLN was still a preeminent threat and that the military was not necessarily involved in the Jesuit murders, they could not deny that at least within Congress, support for Salvadoran aid was waning. Cristiani asserted the complexities of his country’s situation, but repeatedly pledged that he was committed to achieving peace.
“We strongly urge the opening of honest dialogue that can lead to an end to the fighting and to peace with freedom and justice for all Salvadorans.”
The delegation held numerous other meetings over the course of their trip, the outcomes of which it detailed in its interim report (see excerpts below). On the last day of the trip, however, Moakley spoke at the Camino Real Hotel in San Salvador on behalf of the delegation to summarize their immediate findings. Echoing the comments of many of the delegation members in their meeting with Cristiani, Moakley concluded that the government had made progress in the Jesuit murder investigation, but had not sufficiently followed all possible leads. He asserted that the investigators needed to consider the possibility that the eight military members currently under arrest were not “the intellectual authors of the murders.” As he had before the trip, he suggested the possibility of a cover-up, an idea that the task force explored further in its interim report in April (see below). He also noted that even over the short span of this trip, the task force had begun to understand El Salvador’s systematic problems, beyond just the Jesuit murders, and concluded that the need for justice in that case was part of a larger need for social, political, and military reform. Those reforms, and negotiations between the government and the FMLN, would help put El Salvador on the path towards peace.
“It is generally felt that you were sufficiently tough on the Salvadoran military and that the delegation was unified in sending the signal that more needs to be done.”
After the February delegation returned home, the task force began preparing its next steps. In this memo to Moakley, Jim McGovern outlined his recommendations for the task force and praised Moakley for his toughness during talks with the Salvadoran military. The first of his recommendations was that “the group should stay together” to “continue the pressure on [the Salvadoran] government.” Among other items on his list was the provision that the task force issue a factual report of its investigation—not one that includes policy recommendations, since its purpose was to help members of Congress “make future policy decisions.” McGovern likely felt that a report that included recommendations would alienate those in Congress (such as Republicans) who were predisposed to continue U.S. aid to El Salvador. A factual report, especially one that included the Republican delegation members’ names, would have a bipartisan appeal. McGovern suggested that they have the report ready by April.
On April 30, just in time to meet McGovern’s proposed deadline, the task force issued its interim report, addressed to Speaker Thomas Foley. The full 110-page report [HYPERLINK TO FULL REPORT] consisted of the task force’s findings (excerpted below), along with appendices that included research reports and other documentation that the task force used in compiling those findings. The first section, containing the findings, began with a brief introduction to the murders and to the methodology of the task force, followed by a “List of Key Persons Mentioned in Report” and an “Executive Summary” of the task force’s purpose and findings, with a discussion of its concerns and a list of next steps. A detailed account of the Jesuit murders and the investigation comprised the largest section of the report, and it concluded with a list of related issues before presenting the appendices. The thoroughness of the report undoubtedly made an impression among its congressional audience.
“We urge those who read this Report to consider its findings…in the context of other information and other issues relevant to U.S. policy towards El Salvador.”
In the introduction to its report, the task force helpfully reiterated its mandate as being “to monitor the Salvadoran government’s investigation into [the Jesuit murders] and to look into related issues involving respect for human rights and judicial reform in El Salvador.” Although five Republican delegates had accompanied the Moakley Commission to El Salvador in February, the interim report represented only the opinions of the original Democratic members of the task force. Still, it had somewhat of a bipartisan tone, at least in its introduction, where it laid out the general mandate of the task force and briefly summarized its conclusions. As Jim McGovern had suggested, the report stated specifically that “it is not the job of the Task Force to recommend specific changes in U.S. policy towards El Salvador or to examine the full range of issues that are relevant to that policy.” In a likely effort to appease Republican skeptics, in thanking the officials with whom it met in February, the task force thanked the military officers whom (as we will see) were among those that it criticized. It also denounced not just right-wing violence, but also FMLN violence.
“Despite a decade of promises, tens of millions of dollars in U.S. aid and repeated statements that progress is just around the corner, the Salvadoran justice system remains essentially an oxymoron—neither systematic nor just.”
The report’s Executive Summary provided more in-depth yet still concise account of the Moakley Commission’s findings. It included a list of the most important points, of which there were five. Among them was the assertion that the Jesuit murders represented a culture of violence and persecution within the Salvadoran military and that “major reforms within the military are necessary” for wider-reaching improvements to Salvadoran society as a whole. The task force conceded that the Salvadoran authorities conducted “good police work” in their investigation, perhaps in part because they understood that aid from the United States could depend on the successful prosecution of the case. It noted, however, that if “an American military officer” (referring to Major Buckland, although the report does not use his name) had not given investigators key information about the Salvadoran military’s involvement, “those charged with the crime might not have been arrested.” Finally, the task force expressed its concern that the investigation had “come to a virtual standstill” without attempts to address the possibility of senior military involvement and/or a cover-up.
Still avoiding specific policy recommendations, the report listed its hopes for the Jesuit murder investigation and for El Salvador’s future in general. It called for the prosecution and punishment of those responsible for the murders;a continued investigation into the possible involvement in the murders of more senior military officials than those already arrested; more civilian control over the military; judicial reform, to ensure that human rights violations and other crimes are successful prosecuted; and finally, peace negotiations to end the civil war.
“The purpose of the investigation should be to explore all logical possibilities concerning the identity of those directly or indirectly responsible for the murders.”
The next section of the report was its longest, and it chronicled, in detail, the background to the Jesuit murders, the crime itself, and the investigation. This section illuminated aspects of the case of which most members of Congress most likely were not aware. The breadth of information is difficult to summarize, but in composing this detailed account, the task force revealed several important points:
- Father Ignacia Ellacuria, the most prominent of the murdered priests, was a leader in seeking peace negotiations between the government and the FMLN. His communications with FMLN leaders in pursuit of that goal, however, caused suspicion among government officials.
- The FMLN offensive that began just days before the murders, combined with the government’s unfounded view that Father Ellacuria and other Jesuits had FMLN sympathies, likely contributed to the murders.
- In the aftermath of the murders, the treatment of the murder witness, Lucia Barrera de Cerna, contributed to tensions between the U.S. Embassy and the Jesuits at the University of Central America.
- A person whom the report refers to as “the American Major” (again, not using Eric Buckland’s name) was instrumental in providing key information that led to the arrests of members of the military. (The January staff delegation report had questioned Buckland’s decision to wait ten days before informing his superiors of his conversation with Colonel Aviles, but the interim report concluded that he only did so out of fear.) The implication was that the Salvadoran investigation may not have resulted in arrests if this American had not come forward.
- All of those arrested were lower-ranking members of the military, yet Jesuit leaders felt that “a crime of such gravity could [not] have been committed without the knowledge and consent of high officials within the Salvadoran armed forces.” The High Command of the military denied involvement, and investigators had made no attempt “to determine whether or not the possibility of higher level involvement is supported by fact.” The task force did not specifically state that it agreed with the Jesuits that the High Command ordered the murders, but it noted that in the absence of established facts regarding the motives and planning for the murders, investigators needed to address the possibility.
The task force addressed numerous other concerns in this section of its report, but the overall theme was that given the complexities of the Jesuit murder case and the fact that investigators had not yet uncovered the full truth, the investigation needed to continue.
“The Task Force’s most important finding, therefore, is also its simplest. El Salvador must have peace.”
Although the primary focus of the Speaker’s Task Force, and therefore of its interim report, was the progress of the Jesuit murder investigation, it also considered the larger implications of the case. Among the “Related Issues” that it addressed were those “concerning the judicial system, the military as an institution, human rights and the prospects for a negotiated settlement to the
war.” In its report, the task force provided blunt assessments of El Salvador’s conditions in those areas. It asserted, “the Salvadoran justice system flat out does not work.” It noted that he members of El Salvador’s Special Investigative Unit (SIU) were all military officers, which represented a clear conflict of interest not just in the Jesuit murders, but in any case potentially involving military suspects. Answering a question that Moakley posed in his remarks prior to his departure for El Salvador in February, the task force declared, “We are convinced that the military’s contribution to the problems of human rights and a paralyzed justice system are not caused by a few renegade officers; they reside at the heart of the armed forces as an institution.” The task force also made the important point that “the political extremes in El Salvador feed each other while those in the center starve.” It called a declaration of peace “essential.” By concluding its findings with a call for peace, the Speaker’s Task Force underscored the importance of the Jesuit murder investigation as a conduit for broader reforms.
“We do not believe that the investigation into the murders of the Jesuits is complete—and Members of the Task Force will continue to monitor this case and other related matters.”
Moakley released a statement to accompany the interim report in which he very briefly summarized its findings and repeated the five important points that the report outlined. He concluded by making an interesting reference to the supposed “subversive” activities of which the Salvadoran government had allegedly accused the Jesuits, but which Moakley saw as merely helping the poor. He stated, “If justice fails in this case…it will send a chilling message to all who dissent from official government policy or who want to play a more active role in the political life of El Salvador that they must do so at great personal risk.” That statement reflected his commitment to solving the Jesuit murders not just to see justice in that particular case, but also to bringing El Salvador closer to peace.
The official reports of the February 1990 trip are limited to the various meetings that Moakley and his fellow delegation members held with Salvadoran officials, but the group made another important stop during the course of their trip: to the scene of the Jesuit murders at the University of Central America. They saw bullet holes and remnants of blood and viewed crime scene photographs.2 Although this visit surely strengthened the resolve of the Moakley Commission to hold the perpetrators responsible, it also likely served as a reminder and physical example of El Salvador’s widespread violence. By the time the Speaker’s Task Force issued its interim report, its purpose was no longer limited to investigating one specific incident. During the February trip, Moakley learned more about the context of the Jesuit murders and began to further understand the necessity of not just prosecuting this crime, but of changing the entire political and military climates of El Salvador. The task force’s work renewed his commitment to seeking congressional support for legislation that would reform U.S. aid policies to El Salvador, provide support to Salvadoran refugees in the United States, and assist El Salvador in ending its civil war.
Next: Progress on All Fronts (May 1990-November 1990)
Notes:
1 Speaker's Task Force on El Salvador, “DI-0352D Interim Report excerpt: Related Issues,” The People's Congressman: Joe Moakley's Mission for Peace and Justice in El Salvador, accessed July 25, 2016, https://moakleyandelsalvador.omeka.net/items/show/179.
2 Mark Schneider, Joe Moakley’s Journey: From South Boston to El Salvador (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013), 174