Road to the End: Convictions and Peace Negotiations (January 1991-January 1992)

Memo to Moakley from McGovern and Woodward

“Perhaps the best summary of the current status of the case was provided by [a] Salvadoran government official who told us that ‘the armed forces wrote the first act of the Jesuits' case by murdering the priests; now, they are writing the final act by controlling the investigation.’”

In December of 1990, Moakley’s aide, Jim McGovern, and Congressman Gerry Studds’ aide, Bill Woodward, traveled to El Salvador to continue their search for the truth in the Jesuit murder investigation. Reporting to Moakley in January 1991, they expressed confidence “that Col. Benavides and others charged with the murders may be convicted,” but noted that they felt “more strongly than ever” that higher-level military officials had “successful limited the scope of the investigation and protected certain officers from possible prosecution.” The trip reinforced the notion, which Moakley had expressed previously, that the possibility existed that “the murders were ordered by senior military officers not currently charged.”

However, the trip still left many questions unanswered, including Salvadoran officials’ reasons for arresting lower-level officers but not even interviewing their superiors. The task force had asked this question of those officials previously, but had yet to receive “a coherent answer.” McGovern and Woodward also addressed the controversy surround Major Eric Buckland and his “prior knowledge” statement; as Moakley had, McGovern and Woodward expressed more concern about the withholding of information by U.S. officials than about whether Buckland actually knew about the murders ahead of time.  Ultimately, they were more interested in pursuing justice for the victims of the murder than in dwelling on the actions of one American military officer and why he may have changed his testimony. Overall, the December staff trip was a fruitful one; McGovern and Woodward met with some Salvadoran officials, whom they did not name in their report, who shared their concerns about the integrity of the investigation. These conversations and other information that they found strengthened the Moakley Commission’s case in support of a potential cover-up of the murder and of the involvement of higher-level officers. The task force, however, still did not have definitive answers or conclusive evidence to prove either of those theories.

Moakley's statement on Jesuit murder case

“It is my hope that the Administration will continue to press for justice in the Jesuits’ case—perhaps with a gentle nudge from Congress—which I believe will help mightily in achieving a lasting peace for El Salvador.”

In April 1991, Moakley provided an update on the Jesuit murder investigation and other Salvadoran issues to the House’s Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. In his statement, he praised the Bush Administration’s decision of the previous year to withhold aid from El Salvador until it made progress in its peace negotiations. He put aside his previous criticism of U.S. officials’ handling of the investigation, noting, “I have had my differences with the State Department and my disagreements with the Embassy. But I have never once doubted that we are all on the same side.” Those words indicated Moakley’s true commitment to seeking the truth in the Jesuit murders; the “Buckland controversy” had angered him, but he wanted to move past any mishandling of information by U.S. officials so that the investigation could focus on bringing to justice those responsible for killing the six priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter. Alluding to Major Buckland, he stated, “But however concerned we may be about the fact that there are those who had information about those responsible and did not come forward with it—our overriding objective at this point must be to make certain that all those who actively participated in ordering or carrying out the crime are brought to justice.” He concluded by reiterating the need to continue withholding aid as a means for encouraging the Salvadoran government and the military to convict those responsible for the murders and to actively pursue an agreement with the FMLN. Despite the continued problems with the murder investigation, Moakley seemed optimistic continued progress in the United States’ handling of military aid to El Salvador could lead to successful peace negotiations. Indeed, peace talks on April 25 resulted in a preliminary agreement between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN, calling for constitutional reform.²

“I felt I really couldn’t get a complete picture of what El Salvador was all about until I came to a place like Santa Marta where people are living in very tough conditions.”⁵

Moakley nonetheless made the trek out to Santa Marta, a rural, mountain village of about three thousand residents. Journalist Lee Hockstader accompanied Moakley, Jim McGovern, Leonel Gomez, and Ambassador Walker, along with security guards and other members of the press. Hockstader recounted the visit in the Washington Post on July 1, noting that the Santa Marta residents consisted mostly of “old people, children and women,” since most young men, “it is fair to surmise, are dead or have joined the guerillas in the surrounding hills and jungles;” he did note the presence of some young men, however: armed guerillas who stood outside the entrance to the village.6 H also noted the poverty and substandard living conditions: the village had running water, but only one small electrical generator.  Moakley received a mixed reception from villagers. Children gave him gifts and residents had hung a sign that read “Wellcom Senador Smoklin”—a noble attempt at English in a Spanish-speaking village. But the United States-funded Salvadoran government had treated Santa Marta and its guerilla affiliation with “a strategy of isolation,” meaning that it blocked goods from entering the village. Moakley had brought Gillette razors from Boston as a gesture of goodwill, and Walker offered $4500 to build corn silos, but Hockstader spoke to one resident who told him, “This visit is worth nothing. The more aid they give, the more they keep the war going. We think they make these efforts of aid [such as the money for corn silos] so that we’ll get in line and be satisfied. But the real solution is to cut off the military aid – that’s how to end the conflict.”⁷ Some of the greetings that Moakley received from villages were half-hearted. At least one FMLN leader was optimistic, though. Although he was not present in Santa Marta for Moakley’s visit, FMLN leader Joaquin Villalobos later told Jim McGovern that “Santa Marta was a turning point. That’s when we realized that the United States was getting serious about peace. When Moakley came to our turf—and stayed for hours—it showed us respect—something that now American official had shown us—we realized that now was the time to negotiate the end to the war.”⁸

Child's drawing of Santa Marta

The visit to Santa Marta also had an impact on Moakley, who had never seen firsthand the conditions to which the Salvadoran government subjected innocent villagers. According to Hockstader’s account, a child in Santa Marta gave Moakley the drawing shown here (possibly colored with crayons that Moakley had brought as presents); it depicted the peaceful village, with its people, houses, and mountains—surrounded by United States military helicopters that attack the village with gunfire. Throughout his involvement with El Salvador, Moakley had focused on the people who suffered due to the civil war, and this young child’s drawing of military attacks on her home likely reinforced this human element with him, just as seeing the murder scene at the University of Central American had. Villagers like those in Santa Marta were part of the reason that he felt so strongly that peace negotiations needed to continue.

Moakley's remarks at UCA

“It makes no difference in the eyes of God, and it should make no difference in our own eyes, whether a victim of…violence is famous or unknown, rich or poor, a partisan of the left or right or of no side at all. Every one of us is entitled to our rights; and every one of us is entitled to justice when those rights are violated.”

On July 1, Moakley had the opportunity to express publicly his desire for peace in El Salvador in a speech at the University of Central America. With this audience of members of his own Catholic faith, Moakley drew upon the legacy of the slain priests, who “taught us that peace is better than war for the simple reason that life is better than death.” He asserted that the United States could not determine “the appropriate terms for peace in El Salvador,” but it could determine its role in that process. He addressed both the armed forces and the FMLN, telling them that they both must choose justice and respect over violence and cruelty if that wanted to receive assistance from the United States. Responding to those in the U.S. government who told him “not to expect much from El Salvador,” Moakley countered, “I have never seen a people that wanted or deserved peace more than the people of El Salvador.” Returning to his Catholic roots and the sentiments that originally inspired his outrage following the American churchwomen’s murders, Moakley concluded, “I say let us pray that God will grant us the strength, the memory of these martyred heroes always present in our minds, to fulfill this duty [of seeking justice and peace] every day of our lives.”

Moakley's remarks at Suffolk University

“Today, notwithstanding a trial, we remain without the truth. That is a tragedy for those of use in the United States who love justice, but it is a greater tragedy for the people of El Salvador.”

In late September 1991, the Jesuit murder case against eight members of the Salvadoran military went to trial. After three days of testimony and deliberation, the court convicted only two of the eight men charged. It found Colonel Guillermo Benavides guilty of all eight murders and Lieutenant Yusshy Mendoza guilty of the murder of young Celina Ramos.⁹ On September 30, Moakley spoke at Suffolk University, his alma mater, and recounted his reaction to this verdict. He noted, “We should take some satisfaction in the fact this this is the first time an officer of the rank of Colonel has ever been convicted of a human rights violation. But, I must tell, I am very disappointed with the verdict.” This sense of disappointment permeated his entire speech, since he felt that this guilty verdict still did not reveal the truth about the murders. His visit to Santa Marta and the interactions he had with its people had reinforced the need for truth. The truth, and not sham murder investigations, would ensure that innocent Salvadoran citizens did not need to fear that their government and military could commit violent acts without punishment. He asserted his commitment to a continued “push for justice and further investigation.”

Moakley's final statement as Speaker's Task Force chair

“I cannot fulfill my obligation as Chairman, nor can I respond to the criticisms that have been made, without explaining more completely the basis for some of the statements I have made concerning the investigation in the Jesuits' case and the subsequent trial.”

Over the course of its tireless investigative quest between December 1989 and November 1991, the Moakley Commission asked countless questions, yet received far fewer answers. Its conclusions were often far from conclusive. In its interim report, it expressed its opinion that the Salvadoran authorities’ investigation was far from complete, but it could not offer definitive evidence of High Command involvement. Task force members interviewed people whose identities it could not reveal, so its reports on those interactions met with skepticism. None of this is to say that the Moakley Commission’s contributions to the Jesuit murder investigation were anything less that immeasurably valuable; their unceasing commitment to the truth was commendable, and their interim report, among other documents, revealed previously unknown information about the Jesuit murders and the subsequent investigation. Moakley, however, was frustrated by criticism of his task force and its findings, and on November 18, 1991, he directly addressed that criticism in a statement that he suspected was his “final statement” as chairman of the Speaker’s Task Force on El Salvador.

This speech was a complex but important one. Moakley responded directly to a “rebuttal” to the task force’s reports that a group called the Central American Lawyers Group published, in which it said, “the Moakley Commission indicts the entire El Salvador Armed Forces as being responsible for the murders of the priests, yet presents no evidence of any specific orders, general policy, or permissive environment fostered by the High Command demonstrating institutional guilt." Moakley asserted that for confidentiality, and even for personal safety reasons, he could not identify many of his sources. These sources included members of the Salvadoran military who had knowledge of the murders and those responsible, but who feared for their own lives if Moakley, or anyone else, revealed their identities. In compiling information from these sources, however, he arrived at two main conclusions to which he had alluded but not specifically revealed in any of the Moakley Commission’s previous reports.

First, he asserted that according to his sources, at a meeting on the afternoon of November 15, 1989, the day before the Jesuit murders, a group of officers met at the Salvadoran Military School and made the decision to attack the priests at the University of Central America. He then listed “the direct and circumstantial evidence” that supported that claim. Second, he asserted a claim he had made previously, which was that the task force has significant circumstantial evidence to indicate that senior military officials. He revealed, however, a new piece of evidence, which was that “one of those [officers] later accused of the crimes reportedly confessed his involvement in the murders to his commanding officer in mid-December, 1989. That information was reportedly then passed on to General Ponce, but it was not turned over to those investigating the case.” Moakley revealed these developments “to provide additional substantiation statements made in earlier reports;” he was likely offended by the claims of Central American Lawyers Group and could not be silent while they tried to discredit the years of research that the Moakley Commission conducted.