Jesuit Murders: Moakley Commission and Early Investigation (November 1989-January 1990)
“The rape and murder of American nuns, ten years ago, captured our attention--for awhile. The unthinkable murder of a Roman Catholic Archbishop, who was shot while saying mass, shook us into debate over what we are doing in El Salvador, but quickly faded. And now, after over 10 years of military aid, U.S.-trained Salvadoran soldiers are implicated in the massacre of six Jesuit priests, their young cook and her fifteen year old daughter…The murder of six holy men -- in one savage, senseless and barbaric act -- defies our moral comprehension.”1
The shocking nature of the Jesuit murders on November 16, 1989, stoked the fire of the debates already taking place in the United States Congress over U.S. aid to El Salvador and resonated strongly with Congressman Moakley. The fact that the victims shared Moakley’s Catholic faith influenced his outrage, and in fact, he knew three of the priests. But as the quote above indicates, for Moakley, this was not just a religious issue; it was a moral one. The assassination of eight innocent people by government actors was simply unacceptable, especially when the United States had financially supported that government. Fortunately, Moakley’s passion for justice resulted in an opportunity to take a leadership role in the United States’ investigation into the Salvadoran government’s handling of the case. The following documents chronicle Moakley’s reactions to the murders and the creation of a special investigative task force that became known as the Moakley Commission.
“Mr. Speaker, in our society, the murder of a holy man holds a special repugnancy.”
Approximately one week after the murders, Moakley gave an impassioned statement on the floor of the House in support of an amendment proposed by Congressman David Obey (D-WI) to delay military aid to El Salvador in the aftermath of the Jesuit murders (since earlier efforts to end this aid had failed). Echoing the anger that he expressed in his October 1988 remarks regarding the refusal of the Senate to pass his legislation to assist refugees, he told his colleagues, “Talk is cheap…And to date, this Congress and this Administration has responded [to Salvadoran human rights violations] only with words.” He concluded with a statement nearly identical to the one he made seven years earlier, on the anniversary of the churchwomen’s murders: “Let us not allow these holy men to have died in vain. Let their passing mark the beginning of a new intolerance on the part of this Congress towards such unconscionable and sickening acts.” In describing the victims as “holy” rather than specifically as “Jesuits,” Moakley possibly hoped to garner support among a wider audience of Christians, not just Catholics, and inspire them to question the motivations behind such violence (of which we will learn more from upcoming documents). Moakley also referenced the Salvadoran military’s “harassment” of Lutheran churches, as well as nearly half a dozen other attacks on various activists and civilians over the past eight years. Another issue that he raised was an offensive that the government's foes in the FMLN launched just days before the murders in which it took control of several areas of San Salvador. He "wholeheartedly condemned" the operation, but noted that "this is not a debate over who are the good guys and who are the bad guys." The point was that the United States goverment was sending money to a government that at best, failed to investigate human rights violations, and at worst, actually committed such atrocities. He wanted that to stop.
By connecting the wide range of violent acts, Moakley did not diminish the particularly heinous act of murdering priests, but rather emphasized the propensity of the Salvadoran military for violence against any perceived opponent. As had previous attempts to reduce military aid, however, this one fell short; Congressman Obey’s amendment did not pass the House.
“It is my sincere hope that the murderers of these innocent victims will be tried promptly and punished for their crime…”
Although the Obey amendment did not pass, December 1989 was a turning point for Moakley’s involvement in not just the Jesuit murder investigation, but with Salvadoran issues as a whole. Moakley’s ally in his fight against U.S. aid to El Salvador, Gerry Studds, convinced Speaker of the House Thomas Foley to form a Speaker’s Task Force on El Salvador “to monitor the investigation of the Jesuit murders and report on the human rights climate in El Salvador;” Studds recommended that Foley name Moakley as the task force’s chair.2 On December 5, Foley wrote to Moakley to inform him of his creation of the task force, articulating its purpose as being “to gather all available information about the murders, those responsible and the process undertaken to apprehend and bring them to justice.” He took Studds’ suggestion and invited Moakley to serve as the task force’s chair, giving him a new vehicle for his frustration with the U.S. government’s handling of Salvadoran issues and with the Salvadoran government’s track record of failing to prosecute human rights violations effectively. The letter also included a list of the other members of Congress that Foley appointed to the task force—a list comprised solely of Democrats, given the Republican tendency to support the Salvadoran government and the previous resistance of Republicans to enact any changes in U.S. policy towards El Salvador.
“I…will do everything within my abilities to assure that a fair and balanced investigation goes forth.”
Moakley quickly accepted Speaker Foley’s invitation, although he was initially skeptical, given his “bread and butter” reputation. He remarked on more than one occasion that before his leadership of the Speaker’s Task Force, “his idea of foreign affairs was to go to East Boston for an Italian sandwich.”3 Yet his work on Salvadoran causes over the previous nine years was evidence that he was the right person to lead the investigation. He cared about the Salvadoran people, and quite simply, the Salvadoran government’s inability to control its military and its repeated human rights violations made him angry. Moakley had called the Salvadoran immigration issue a “humanitarian” one, and the Jesuit murders and other similar crimes certainly were humanitarian issues as well. The United States’ continued support of the Salvadoran government and its refusal to suspend aid in the aftermath of the murders, however, cemented Moakley’s political motivations. Accepting the task force chairmanship allowed him a political outlet to address El Salvador’s human rights crisis that went beyond giving speeches and sponsoring legislation. He was hesitant given his lack of foreign policy experience (despite his involvement with Salvadoran issues, he had yet to travel there), but he had a vested interest in the country, and he did not want to give up on it. Although he had already condemned the murders as a larger ethical issue, not just a religious one, at the time, Catholics “constituted the largest denomination in the house,” so his own identification as a Catholic could only help his cause.
On December 6, his office issued a press release to announce his acceptance of the chairmanship and to outline the importance of such a task force. Moakley condemned the recent violence and asserted his commitment to “monitor[ing] the situation” in El Salvador. The second document shown here is a list of the eighteen task force members and their staff contacts; these staff members, especially Moakley’s aide, Jim McGovern, were instrumental in the activities of the task force and even traveled to El Salvador on its behalf without their respective congressional representatives. Their names appear frequently in the correspondence, memoranda, and reports in the Moakley Papers.
“This outrage must be investigated thoroughly, those responsible apprehended and promptly brought to justice.”
Also on December 6, Foley’s office issued its own press release that reiterated what Foley had written in his letter to Moakley, but also alluded to an important facet of the task force: Foley’s directive that it “monitor the efforts of the Government of El Salvador’s investigation” of the murders [emphasis added]. This distinction is important, because the commission’s purpose was not to conduct the actual criminal investigation, but to track its progress to ensure that the Salvadoran government conducted its investigation properly (since the United States was still providing funds to El Salvador). Still, the members of the “Moakley Commission,” as some began to call it, did do investigative work; it just was not part of the Salvadoran government’s official investigation.4
“It is important to recognize that one of the reasons Salvadoran policy has not worked is that Members of Congress have been insufficiently persistent and insufficiently precise in asking questions.”
Speaker Foley outlined the purpose of the task force briefly in his press release, but an unidentified member of the task force staff composed this document to provide more details about its mandate, some background on its creation, and its goals and methodology. He wrote, “In plain English, the purpose of the group is…to gather as much information as possible about certain recent events in El Salvador, to organize that information, and to make that information available…” According to this document, one of the ultimate goals of the task force was to provide information to other members of Congress that would help inform future policy decisions (such as decreases in or reallocation of aid) that would help lead El Salvador down a path towards peace. An interesting note in this document is the statement that the task force should “produce a one-time hand off of information to the leadership and let them take it from there,” with a report issued at the end of January (or February, according to a handwritten correction). The Moakley Commission’s investigation proved to be much more than a “one-off” scenario; Moakley continued to lead the task force in its work through November 1991.
“Mr. President, I have great respect for you and your commitment to ending the war and bringing true democracy to the people of El Salvador.”
One of Moakley’s first orders of business as the leader of the task force was to reach out to El Salvador’s president, Alfredo Cristiani, who had defeated the former president José Napoleón Duarte in the presidential election of 1989. Cristiani had publicly denounced the murders and pledged to bring those responsible to justice.5 On December 13, 1989, Moakley sent a letter to President Cristiani, notifying him of the creation of the task force and its goal of, again, monitoring the murder investigation, and also asking Cristiani for his assistance as the task force pursued that goal. He indicated that he planned for the task force to conduct some of its work during trips to El Salvador.
"El Salvador is likely to be a major issue.”
By mid-December, the task force had begun preparing for its first trip to El Salvador, scheduled for January 1990. Planning documents like this one show the thoroughness of the research that took place as the task force prepared to begin its formal oversight of the murder investigation, and they also reveal the extent of the turmoil in El Salvador. Task force members compiled background information on a range of topics relevant to understanding how the murder investigation would likely proceed in the context of El Salvador’s military, economic, and political climate. As the author of these notes indicated, the rivalry between the right-wing military and the left-wing FMLN guerillas continued to grow, the economy was “in tatters,” and the judicial codes included extreme and antiquated policies that hindered the successful prosecution of crimes. The information compiled in this report likely stimulated Moakley’s resolve in not just ensuring justice in the Jesuit murder case, but in addressing the wider issues present in El Salvador.
In compiling their research, the task force found information about the FBI’s involvement in the investigation that gave Moakley other reasons for concern. The earliest days of the murder investigation had revealed that a janitor who lived at the University of Central America (UCA) named Lucia Cerna had witnessed at least part of the events of November 16. With the support of local Jesuits, she testified before the Salvadoran attorney general and the judge investigating the case that she heard shooting and saw men who members of the military. Near the end of November, Salvadoran officials, in cooperation with the U.S. State Department and the U.S. embassy in El Salvador, flew Ms. Cerna, her husband, and her daughter to Miami following her testimony, for safety reasons.
Although she had already given an official testimony in El Salvador before the appropriate officials, the FBI in Miami took it upon themselves to subject her to further interrogations, alone and without legal representation. In addition to two FBI agents, one of her interviewers was Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Rivas, the head of El Salvador’s Special Investigations Unit and a member of its military—meaning he was part of the group that Ms. Cerna had implicated as responsible for the murders. Under intense pressure from her interrogators and afraid that they did not believe her, Ms. Cerna changed her story several times and then failed a lie detector test. In El Salvador, President Cristiani denounced her as an unreliable witness, which angered her Jesuit supporters both in the United States and in El Salvador. All of these actions indicated a clear resistance on the part of both U.S. and Salvadoran officials to consider that the Salvadoran military had had a role in the Jesuit murders, despite its violent track record.6
“I changed my story so that they would not continue questioning me like they have been doing before, because everything I told them they didn’t believe.”
On December 19, Moakley had the opportunity to interview Lucia Cerna himself (using a Spanish interpreter) and this time, lawyer Scott Greathead of the Lawyer’s Committee on Human rights accompanied her. Father Paul Tipton of the Association of Jesuit Colleges and several task force members were all present. The Moakley Commission hoped to learn the truth of Ms. Cerna’s original testimony and understand the circumstances surrounding her interrogation in Miami. She reiterated what she had told the investigators in El Salvador, which was that on the night of the murders, she was in her room at UCA when she awoke to the sound of gunshots. She looked out her window and saw five men, at least two of whom were wearing camouflage clothing adorned with patches, similar to military uniforms.
When Moakley and the other task force members asked her why she changed her story under FBI questioning, she told them that she did not think that they believed her anyway and had felt so much pressure from them that she told them that she had not actually seen anything. Even assuming that Ms. Cerna did actually see men in military uniforms committing the murders, her testimony was still vague; she could not see their faces and was not sure that all of the men she saw wore the same uniform. Her treatment by the FBI had the larger implication of straining relations between the Moakley Commission and both U.S. and Salvadoran officials. It also magnified tensions between the Jesuits who sought justice and the factions who saw the Jesuits’ desire to assist the poor as subversive, potentially communist behavior. A summary of Ms. Cerna’s testimony and treatment appears here.7
“…I have concluded that the investigation into the killings has made substantial progress, but I worry that the possibility of a coverup remains.”
Armed with the knowledge gained from the interview with Lucia Cerna and its other background research, members of the Moakley Commission traveled to El Salvador from January 8th through the 10th, 1990. The delegation consisted only of task force staff members, not Moakley or any of his congressional colleagues. At this stage of the investigation, the purpose of the trip was “to gather information pertaining to the Salvadoran government’s investigation” of the Jesuit murders; the task force staff was capable of completing the fact-finding mission on their own, so they made the trip alone and left the actual members to attend to their other congressional duties. Upon the delegation’s return, Moakley issued this press release indicating that he was pleased with the government investigation’s progress but had some reservations about its thoroughness. He asserted “the possibility of a coverup,” likely based not only on the Salvadoran government’s prior refusals to effectively prosecute other human rights violations, but also on the knowledge that the FBI and its ally in the Salvadoran military, Lieutenant Colonel Rivas, has intimidated a witness into changing her story. Moakley vowed that the task force “would continue to monitor closely the progress on the investigation.”
“…it is necessary to remain vigilant until the judicial process is completed.”
Several days after its return, and after Moakley issued his press release, the January delegation released its formal trip report (although it is undated, it includes details of post-trip developments that occurred on January 14). Moakley had alluded to the fact that investigators had identified potential perpetrators, and the author of this report confirmed that on January 7, just before the delegation’s arrival President Cristiani had “singled out the military as the prime suspect in the murders.” This was certainly a welcome development, considering that Cristiani had previously denied military involvement, but the information that the delegation gathered still raised concerns. The Salvadoran investigation focused on a military unit called the Atlacatl Battalion, whose members received their training in the United States, which was certainly cause for concern. Additionally, McGovern and the other delegation members learned that a U.S. military officer stationed in El Salvador, Major Eric Buckland, had information about the murders that he withheld from investigators for nearly ten days. Specifically, right before Christmas, he had a conversation with Salvadoran Colonel Carlos Armando Aviles, who told him that another colonel, Armando Guillermo Benavides had made statements that indicated that he might have been involved in the murders. Major Buckland did not report this information to his superiors until January 2, but then later failed a polygraph test under questioning. The chain of events was very complicated, but suffice it to say, the delegation members had questions about Buckland’s knowledge of the events, the role of his testimony in the investigation, and why he did not inform investigators sooner (Moakley and the other task force members would look into Buckland’s involvement as they continued their investigation). Even after Cristiani announced on January 14 that the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) had arrested and charged eight members of the Salvadoran military with the murders, in its report, the delegation indicated that it still had many unanswered questions about the integrity of the investigation.
The report also included information on religious issues. From interviews with Jesuit officials, the delegation learned that “the current political climate has resulted in repression and threats against the church,” and that the Church distrusted the United States Embassy and its officials (the FBI’s treatment of Lucia Cerna was certainly a contributing factor to this). Indeed, among the delegation’s conclusions was a statement that illuminated part of the motivation for the El Salvador’s history of violence against religious figures: “One of the contributing factors…appears to be the attitude of the military and its view that certain religious groups and officials are communists and accomplices of the FMLN [the left-wing guerilla group].” Many Salvadoran Jesuits were vocal in their support of liberation theology, which focused heavily on supporting the poor again oppressive government regimes.8 It is unlikely that the Jesuits were communists or guerilla sympathizers, but if their support of liberation theology led the military government to fear that they were, it is not surprising that they became targets. The Salvadoran government’s allies in the Unites States may not have condoned the murders, but their shared opposition to communism likely affected the level to which they pursued the prosecution of members of the military.
“We are most grateful for your commitment to the work of the Task Force, and pledge our every assistance to your efforts.”
Consistent with the January delegation’s statement that the arrests of eight military members would not necessarily suffice as justice, on January 24, the president of the United States-based Jesuit Conference, Patrick J. Burns, S.J., wrote to Moakley to refute President Cristiani’s indication “that the investigation is complete.” Father Burns echoed Moakley’s concern that the trigger-pullers were not the only ones responsible, as well as the delegation’s concern about the relationship between the Salvadoran government and Salvadoran Jesuits. Father Burns also raised the point that the Jesuit priests “died in part because they spoke against the abuses inflicted on the Salvadoran people” (likely referring to their liberation theology). Like Moakley, he felt that El Salvador faced systemic problems in its prosecution of human rights violations and other crimes, and that “the prosecution of this case must be part of the process of…reforming the Salvadoran system of justice.” He assured Moakley that the task force had the full support of both the Jesuit Conference and members of the Jesuit church in El Salvador.
“Additional acts of violence should not be the only catalyst forcing us to take action. The problems of El Salvador need to be reexamined from a fresh perspective, free of the black and white characterizations that have caused us to spin our wheels for more than a decade.”
On January 27, Moakley spoke at Boston’s Clover Club, “an Irish-American version of a Brahmin gentleman’s club” that also had strong Catholic leanings, given its Irish association.9 In this speech (in which he reflected candidly on his own faith as a Catholic), he expressed his outrage over the November 16th murders, as well as the violent acts that preceded it, referring to the churchwomen murders and the assassination of Archbishop Romero. He addressed what he saw as the motivation behind the attacks: the supposed “subversion” of Jesuit Catholics who sought to help the poorest Salvadorans who were the victims of the military government’s thirst for power and violent repression. He criticized the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, William Walker, for “look[ing] the other way in the face of church persecution,” likely alluding to the U.S. government’s continued focus on communism as a threat above all others.
He also commented on his own motivations, noting that some people had asked him why he got involved in such a complicated issue; he said, “The answer simply is that I was shocked into it.” From the Moakley Commission’s research over the past two months, he had learned the extent of the corruption of El Salvador’s military government and it left him more disturbed than ever that the United States continued to provide it with military aid. These remarks initiated the next phase of the Speaker’s Task Force on El Salvador’s mission “to create the conditions which will pave the way for more tolerance in that country and…to create a climate that will allow both sides [the military and the FMLN] to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the killing.”
As these documents have shown, the Moakley Commission took its mandate seriously. Just two months after the murders, it had already sent one delegation to El Salvador and was preparing to send a second, this time with Moakley present. The anger that Moakley expressed in his Clover Club speech would motivate his quest for answers during the February 1990 trip and in the following months leading up to the task force’s April 30, 1990, interim report.
Next: Moakley Commission: Lead-up to Interim Report (January 1990-April 1990)
Notes
1 Moakley, John Joseph, “DI-0778 Congressman John Joseph Moakley's Clover Club remarks,” The People's Congressman: Joe Moakley's Mission for Peace and Justice in El Salvador, accessed July 25, 2016, https://moakleyandelsalvador.omeka.net/items/show/44.
2 Mark Schneider, Joe Moakley’s Journey: From South Boston to El Salvador (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013), 168. Foley did not give his task force an official name, but records in the Moakley Papers repeatedly refer to it as the Speaker’s Task Force on El Salvador.
3 Ibid, 168.
4 The origins of the term “Moakley Commission” are unclear, but it appears throughout the Moakley Papers as an alternative to “Speaker’s Task Force on El Salvador.”
5 Schneider, Joe Moakley's Journey, 162, 167
6 Teresa Whitfield, Paying the Price: Ignacio Ellacuria and the Murdered Jesuits of El Salvador (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 85-88.
7 View Ms. Cerna’s full interview transcript here.
8 Whitfield, Paying the Price, 39-40.
9 Schneider, 172.